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Agents' Need of Written Authority
The sections of the Statute of Frauds enacted in Penn-
sylvania on March 21, 1772,1 are as follows:
"1. All leases, estates, interests of freehold or term of
years, or any uncertain interest of, in or out of any mes-
suages, manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, made
and creatcd by livery and seisen only, or by parol, and not put
in writing and signed by the parties so making or creating
the same, or their agents thereunto authorized by writing,
shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will
only; * * * except, nevertheless, all leases not exceeding the
term of three years from the making thereof.
"2. And moreover, no leases, estates or interests, either
of freehold or terms of years, or any uncertain interests of,
in or out of any messuages, manors, lands, tenements or
hereditaments, shall at any time be assigned, granted or
surrendered, unless it be by deed or note in writing, signed
by the party so assigning, granting or surrendering the
same, or their agents, thereto lawfully authorized by writing,
or by act and operation of law."
Section 5 of the Act of April 22, 1856,2 provided: "That
no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person
upon any contract hereafter to be made for the sale of
lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or
concerning them, unless the agreement upon which such
action shall be brought shall be in writing and be signed
by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person
thereunto by him lawfully authorized by writing."
The Act of May 13th, 1857,3 provides: "That the fifth
section of the Act of 22d April, 1856, entitled 'An Act for
the greater certainty of title and more secure enjoyment
of real estate,' be and the same is hereby repealed, and all
actions and proceedings at law and equity may be held and
11 Sm. 389, 2 Stewart's Purdon 1753,
2p. L. 532, 2 Purd. 1757.
ap. L. 500.
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maintained in like manner as if said fifth section had never
been passed."
In Bowser v. Cessna,4 Justice Sharswood says: "The 4th
section of the 'English Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, 29
Car. 2, c. 3 was purposely omitted from our Act of March
21st, 1772 (1 Smith 389); and although it was enacted by
the 5th section of the Act of April 22d, 1856 (Pamph. L.
533), that section was repealed the year following by the
Act of May 13th. 1857 (Pamph. L. 500). Recoveries in ac-
tions of this nature have been sustained in our courts from
the earliest periods: Bell v. A ndrews, 4 Dall. 152; Ewing v.
Tees, 1 Bin. 450." The action was assumpsit by a vendor
against a purchaser of real estate on a parol contract.
In Ewing z. Thompson,Justice Read says: "It is much to
be regretted, that the 5th section of the act for the greater
certainty of title, and more secure enjoyment of real estate,
passed the 22d of April, 1856, was repealed by the Act of
13th of May, 1857. A state with three millions and a half
inhabitants, with railroads connecting her most distant
points, and a common school system pervading the whole
Commonwealth, is certainly prepared to require that all
contracts for the sale of land shall be in writing. In allow-
ing actions for damages, on verbal contracts, for the sale
of lands, we differ not only with'the law of England, but
I believe with the law of every other state in the Union.
A policy thus universal must be right, and we thought so
for one year. By our law such an action may be sustained,
etc."
The 4th section of the Act of April 22, 1856, (supra)
provides: "All declarations or creations of trusts or con-
fidences of any lands, tenements or hereditaments and all
grants and assignments thereof shall be manifested by
writing, signed by the party holding the title thereof, or by
his last will in writing, or else be void, etc."
The statutes quoted are the only Pennsylvania statutes
relating to the form of contracts for the leasing or sale
462 Pa. 148, (1869).
566 Pa. 382, (1870).
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of real estate. Since the act of 1772 purports to relate only
to the formal requisites of leases and transfers of interests
in land and the statute purporting to deal with agreements
to convey has been repealed, it might be supposed that such
agreements could rest in parol and that the agents of the
parties could be verbally authorized. Since the contrary is
the law, it is proposed to trace the development of the law
on the subject.
In Nicholson's Lessee v. Mifflin,6 it was assumed with-
out discussion that the authority of a vendor's agent must
be in writing. In the report of this case in 2 Yeates 38, it
is said: "The power of an agent authorized to sell lands
must be in writing, and proved by indifferent witnesses,
under the act 'for the prevention of frauds and perjuries',
passed 21st March, 1772. (Prov. Laws, 462) * ** It is true,
this act of assembly should be construed liberally, and the
law not requiring the written authority of the agent to be
signed by the party, it is to be sufficient if the authority is
reduced to writing by his orders, but of this due proof must
be had."
In Snively v. Luce,7 four tenants in common appointed
by parol four others to partition their lands. This was done
on the ground and the agents confirmed their division by a
writing sealed, acknowledged and recorded. But separate
possession was not taken in pursuance of the partition.
"Per Curiam.- An unexecuted parol partition is void:
and it is still parol when made by the intervention of agents,
pursuant to a parol authority, though their act be evinced
by a writing under seal. That can give it no additional
authority; and the whole being irrelevant and void, ought
not to have gone to the jury."
In McDowell v. Simpson,' one of several heirs signed a
leasc for seven years as attorney for all the heirs but with
no written authority. It was held that no parol ratification
could make it more than a lease at will, as "by the very
62 Dallas 246, (1796).
71 Watts 69, (1832).
83 Watts 129, (1834).
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words of the act against fraud" the agent must be "lawfully
authorized by writing." This case further held that the
tenancy would become one from year to year, if the tenant
remained in possession for more than a year.9
In Vanhorne v. Frick,10 Chief Justice Tilghman held that
a purchaser could not maintain ejectment to enforce a
sale made by an agent who had only a parol authority from
the owner but that the contract was as binding as a parol
sale by the principal.
In Ewing v. Tees,' the same judge had said: It is evi-
dent that this provision extends only to the estate intended
to be passed. No estate in lands shall be conveyed by one
person to another, unless the agent is authorized by writ-
ing. But it is one thing to convey an estate, and another
and very different thing to make an agreement that you
will convey it. It might be good policy to establish certain
soleniities, without which the title of land could not be
transferred; because the peace and happiness of society
are promoted by the clearness and facility with which the
titles of real estate may be ascertained, and by preventing
those frauds and perjuries which would inevitably take
place, if after a great length of time it was permitted to
establish a title by parol evidence only. Whereas, an action
for damages for not performing a contract, is of much less
moment. The jury may give such damages as, under the
circumstances of each case, appear reasonable, and these
damages will often be very small; and there is less danger
of perjury, because those actions are limited, so that they
must be commenced in six years. I should think the case
sufficiently clear, if it was taken upon the act of assembly,
without any other consideration; but it is still clearer, when
we turn to the English statute of frauds and perjuries, 29
C. 2 c. 3. It is plain that our legislature had that statute
9Dumm v. Rothermel, 112 Pa. 272, (1886); Walter v. Transue, 17
Pa. Super. Ct. 94, (1901), and Inst. etc. v. Lingenfelser, 296 Pa. 493,
(1929) accord.
106 S. & R. 90, (1820).
'll Binney 450, (1808) and see McGunnagle v. Thornton, 10 S. &
R. 251, (1823).
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before them, when they framed the act in question; be-
cause that part of our law which I have recited, is copied
very nearly verbatim from the English law. But there is
a total omission of the fourth section of the English statute,
which enacts, that no action shall be brought to recover
damages upon any 'contract or sale of lands, tenements, or
hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning the same,
unless the agreement on which it is brought, or some mem-
orandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by
the party to be charged therewith, or some other person
thereunto by him lawfully authorized.' It is impossible
that this omission should have been accidental. It must have
been intended to leave the common law unaltered, as to the
redress which it affords for breach of a parol contract by
recovery of damages. Agreeable to this construction is the
sentiment expressed by this court, in the case of Bell v.
Andrews, 4 Dall. 152."
In Twitchell v. The City of Philadelphia,"2 which was an
action for the purchase price of land sold by the plaintiff
to the defendant, Justice Read said:
"But there is another insuperable difficulty in this case,
that George W. Brown was not an agent of the city 'there-
unto lawfully authorized by writing', which is an essential
requisite, by our Act of Assembly, in such a case for the
purchase of lands, in order to enable a vendor to enforce a
specific performance of it. Vanhorne v. Frick, 6 S. & R. 90;
McDowell v. Simpson, 3 Watts 129; Parrish v. Koons, 1 Par-
sons 89. All the cases cited by the plaintiff in error to
establish the contrary doctrine, occurred under the 4th and
17th sections of the English Statute of Frauds, which
sections were never re-enacted in this state." Now Vanhorne
v. Frick only decided that the landowner's agent must have
written authority to sell. The form of authority required
to enable a purchaser to contract through an agent was not
involved in the case. McDowell v. Simpson only involved
the power of an agent to bind the landowners on a long
lease without a written authorization. Parrish v. Koons
1233 Pa. 212, (1859).
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was a vendor's suit for the purchase price and Judge King
held that while the agent of either party, authorized only
by parol, could sign a written contract and so bind his
principal sufficiently to enable the other to recover dam-
ages, neither could enforce the specific execution of such
a contract. Recovery was denied in the Twitchell case be-
cause the purchaser's agent had only a verbal authorization.
Twitchell v. Philadelphia contains no reasoning in sup-
port of the conclusion that written authority is as essential
when the agent represents the purchaser as when he repre-
sents the vendor. Parrish v. Koons makes an attempt to
justify this conclusion. First, it is said, the statute uses
the words "parties or their agents" but the court overlooks
the fact that the "parties" mentioned in the statute are only
those who create, assign or surrender an estate in land
and a purchaser does none of these things. Second, it. is
said that equity should treat both parties alike and hence
that the vendee should be required to sign either in per-
son or by an agent authorized in writing. It has long been
settled that a written contract signed by the vendor, but
not by the vendee, is specifically enforceable by both s and
it is an obvious anomaly to require that the vendee's agent
must have written authority when he happens to sign the
contract for his principal. His written promise should not
be less effective than a verbal one and if the principal can
make a verbal promise directly, why may he not do so
through an agent verbally authorized?
In Tuttleman v. Beetem," a case of a lease containing
an option which, if exercised, would create an interest in
the land exceeding three years from the original date of
the lease, the lease was signed by the lessees but not by
the lessors. Judge Henderson quotes the statute and then
observes: "The lessees did not create the estate. They
had no capacity so to do. The lessors alone could demise
the premises and vest the title for the term in the lessees.
This is the clear requirement of the statute as is shown
l3Brodhead v. Reinbold, 200 Pa. 618, (1901).
2448 Pa. Super. Ct. 345, (1911).
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in Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424."
In King v. Myers,' an executor with authority to sell
but none to lease executed a long term lease and the devises
received the rents from him. He signed as executor and
not as agent of the devisees. The doctrine of McDoweU v.
Simpson,1 that ratification of a lease beyond the statutory
term must be in writing, was reiterated, and the lease was
held effective only to create an estate at will.
The cases are also numerous in which a purchaser has
been denied specific performance on the ground that the
vendor's agent lacked the requisite authority in writing. 7
It also has been decided repeatedly that a vendee can
no more acquire an estate in land under a parol ratification
by a vendor of a sale made by his agent than he can when
the vendor's agent has acted under a parol authorization. 8
The fourth section of the English statute requires the
writing to be signed by the "party to be charged therewith"
but no such language is used in the Pennsylvania statutes
relating to real estate transactions. Nevertheless the phrase
has crept into our appellate court opinions. Discussing a
lease from month to month, which of course would have
been good though there had been no writing, Judge Orlady,
in Schultz v. Bulbock, 19 sustained a judgment in ejectment
on a lease signed only by the lessee on the ground that "the
requirements of the statute are answered by a memor-
andum in writing signed by the party to be charged there-
with". He notes that the purpose of the statute was the
protection of landowners and that a sale contract signed
by a vendor only and accepted by the vendee satisfies the
statute but he utterly misconceived why that is true.
1560 Pa. Super. Ct. 345, (1915).
16See note 8 ante. Dumn v. Rothermel, 112 Pa. 272, (1886); Jen-
nings v. McComb, 112 -Pa. 518, (1886); Harper Bros. & Co. v.
Jackson, 240 Pa. 312, (1913); Mott v. Kaldes, 288 Pa. 264, (1927);
Willis-Winchester Co. v. Clay, 293 Pa. 513, (1928) accord.
17Heinicke v. Krouse, 14 W. N. C. 106, (1883); Knerr's App., 16
W. N. C. 74, (1885); Tighe v. Doran, 7 Kulp 124, (1893); Croskey
v. Stockley, 85 Pa. Super. Ct. 498, (1925).
ISLIewellyn v. Sunnyside Coal Co., 242 Pa. 517, (1914).
1'6 Pa. Super. Ct. 573, (1898).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Some such misconception may explain the statement in
Humphrey v. Brownz7U that an agent cannot bind a purchaser
of real estate unless he has written authority or there has
been a subsequent ratification in writing. The cases cited
to support this proposition are both cases holding merely
that the owner's agent must have written authority to make
a long lease. The statement was unnecessary and may be
treated as a dictum which will hardly be followed. Recent
cases recognize that the mere approval of a deed exhibited
to a purchaser is enough to entitle him to compel con-
veyance of the land described in it." It would hardly be
held that if such approval were that of his counsel, it would
not have this effect, unless his counsel had a written power
of attorney. As already observed, why should one who
need sign nothing to be bound be required to authorize
another in a signed writing, if his agent is to bind him?
The purchaser of a leasehold estate having more than
three years to run may be made to pay the agreed price
after acceptance of the surrender by the act of his agent.
No suggestion is made that the agent must have written
authority to accept.
22
Section 4 of the Sales Act of 1915 and the Act of April
27, 1925,23 may be satisfied by a "note or memorandum in
writing of the contract or sale signed by the party to be
charged or his agent in that behalf." Since the statute is
silent as to the form of the agent's authorization, no change
from the common law can be presumed.2 4 Hence the agent's
authority to sign the writing required by this section may
be shown by parol 5
The conclusion is that it is only in those cases in which
an agent attempts to act for a landowner that he may re-
20291 Pa. 53, (1927).
21Shrut v. Huselton, 272 Pa. 113, 117, (1922); Shapiro v. Kazmier-
ski et al., 283 Pa. 242, (1925).
22Davis et al. v. Inv. Land Co., 296 Pa. 449, (1929); Jenkins v.
Root, 269 Pa. 229, (1920).
23p. L. 310.
24Jessup & Moore P. Co. v. Bryant P. Co., 283 Pa. 434, 442, (1925).
25McGowan v. Lustig-Burgerhoff, 93 Pa. Super. Ct. 227, (1928).
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quire written authority and that he needs it then only to
pass an estate in the land. Though he may impose an obli-
gation upon a vendor principal, when he has only a parol
authority, the purchaser cannot have specific performance
and the measure of damages is not the same as if he had
had a written authorization, for the contract is to be dee~ned
a parol contract.2 6 The agents of vendees and lessees of
land do not require authority in writing.
26Seidlek v. Bradley, 293 Pa. 379, (1928) and see comment on
this case in 33 Dick. Law Rev. 87.
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